Determinism is Incompatible With Moral Responsibility

Is Molinism Compatible With Human Free Will?

Molinism (or the thesis of Middle Knowledge) is the view that God knows the future by knowing his middle knowledge in conjunction with God's free knowledge of his own (contingent) actions.  His middle knowledge is knowledge of subjunctive conditionals of the form "If x were in circumstance C, then x would freely do A."

Like God's natural knowledge--his knowledge of what is possible, necessary, and impossible--God's middle knowledge is logically prior to his decision to create (or actualize) this world.  But like God's free knowledge, middle knowledge is of contingently true propositions.

Here is an example of how God knows the future on the basis of middle knowledge:

1. God knows that if Eve were placed in the garden, she would freely eat the fruit.
2. God knows that he creates a world in which Eve is placed in the garden.
3. God deduces that Eve will eat the fruit.*

Now suppose we understand free will to be incompatible with determinism and define a free action as follows:

An action A is free in circumstance C if and only if it is elicited by an agent G in C and G is not causally determined to elicit A.

Then Molinism is compatible with human free actions.  For God creates circumstances in which agents such as Eve elicit an action (e.g. an intention or other act of will), but God and other agents (or events) do not causally determine that the action is elicited--rather Eve exercises her will of her own accord.

But suppose we add that the future is open to Eve such that there are two possible futures open to Eve at some time T.  In one possible future at T, Eve freely eats the fruit; in another possible future Eve freely refrains from eating the fruit.  That is, we think that a free action is defined as follows:

An action A at time T in circumstance C is free if and only if it is elicited by an agent G, G is not causally determined to elicit A, and at T in C, G has the ability to refrain from willing A or to will some other action B.

Then Molinism is incompatible with human free will. For on the Molinist understanding God is able to know what G would freely do in C and there is only one free action G would do if C were actual.  That is, there is no other possible circumstance C wherein G freely refrains from A or elicits some other action B.  There are not two possible futures open to G where, in the exact same circumstances G freely wills A in C but freely refrains or wills B in C.  If A were to refrain or will B in C, A would be causally determined to do so.

So is Molinism incompatible with free will?  If free will requires that one have a power such that alternative possibilities are open to one in virtue of having that power then the answer is, no.


*  If God is atemporal it is difficult to see how God could have foreknowledge, properly speaking, according to Molinism.  God would have B-theory knowledge--for instance he would know that Rome's burning precedes Obama getting elected president in the ordered sequence of events--but God would not have knowledge at Rome's burning that Obama will be elected president.

If God is temporal then he would have genuine foreknowledge.  He would have it on the basis of his middle knowledge and quasi-perceptual knowledge that such and such time is now and such and such later time is in the future with respect to the present.

Determinism

In Earl Conee and Ted Sider's Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics, Chapter Six: Free Will and Determinism, towards the beginning they say

Here is a fact: every event has a cause.  This fact is known as determinism.

A little internet searching and one can find a few others defining determinism in this way.  But that definition seems to me odd.  For one, simply having a cause is not sufficient for an event to be determined, for it is broadly logically possible that an event might have a contributory cause but no necessitating cause.

The common definition of determinism is not that every event has a cause, rather it is the following: For any event or state of affairs, given some event E or state of affairs S at time T1 and the laws of nature, another event E2 or S2 must (nomologically) occur or (in the case of states of affairs) obtain. 

This definition (or something close to it) is what compatibilists have in mind when they say that free will is compatible with determinism.  This definition also leaves open that the first event (or initial state of affairs) has no cause, which Conee and Sider's definition does not, and so has the virtue of being consistent with what many determinists actually believe, namely that determinism holds in our universe even if there is no cause of the first event. 

Their statement above is also problematic because of the claim that determinism is a known fact.  Kant spends a good deal of the Critique of Pure Reason trying to establish that every event has a cause (as do others recently such as Alexander Pruss in The Principle of Sufficient Reason.)  If it is a known fact (I think it is a fact) it is certainly not the sort of known fact to be included in an introductory philosophical work stated as a known fact.  Especially when it is stated as determinism.  Determinism, properly defined, is certainly not a known fact.

Christianity, Theocracy, and Liberal Democracy

Christians think that Christianity is The Way.  Jesus is thought to be divine, and his way is the way for humanity.  Everyone should not murder.  Everyone should not lust.   Everyone should turn the other cheek. Everyone should not steal.  Everyone should love their enemies.  Everyone should trust in Jesus.

Moreover it is thought Jesus's way is the only way.  "I am the way, the truth, and the life."  Salvation hinges on having faith in Jesus, living by his ethics, avoiding sins unto death, and so on.

The stakes are immense.  Given the immensity of the stakes, Christians should do all they can to turn people to The Way.  So why shouldn't Christians living in a state which is not a theocracy, advocate and do all that they can to bring about a theocracy?  Why should they not compel Muslims to profess that "Jesus is Lord" or face imprisonment, fine dissident atheists $135,000 who refuse to photograph a Christian wedding and thus cause psychological harm, and compel all states to recognize Christian marriages?

Liberal Christians often have scorn for the "theocratic Christian right," but should they given the stakes which involve eternal consequences?  Rarely is an argument given for why a theocracy should not be advanced.

Perhaps this is a beginning of an argument: Christians should not advocate for a theocracy for the central reason given to explain why God Himself allows there to be so much evil (i.e. for the Problem of Evil): He greatly values freedom and autonomy and, as such, coercion is to be avoided. 

Of course more needs to be said if one thinks that Christians, given the massive, coercive nature of the state should not advocate anarchy or libertarianism but socialism or something in between.  More can (and should) be said.

Now Playing: Free Will

There are those who think that life has nothing left to chance
A host of holy horrors to direct our aimless dance

A planet of play things
We dance on the strings
Of powers we cannot perceive
'The stars aren't aligned
Or the gods are malign...'
Blame is better to give than receive

[Chorus:]
You can choose a ready guide in some celestial voice
If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice
You can choose from phantom fears and kindness that can kill
I will choose a path that's clear
I will choose freewill

What are the Philosophical Implications of the Urge to Urinate?

Not many, as far as I can see.  People are less likely to believe in free will when they have urges they have little control over.  I can buy that.  But having false beliefs and believing things without good arguments is perfectly consistent with having free will.

Does Science Disprove Free Will?

According to this author the answer is a resounding "NO."  I just finished Alfred Mele's most recent book on the issue.  It's written for a popular audience and is very clear & well written.  For $10-15 the book is probably overpriced given that it consists in a mere 95 pages.  But it's a fun a little read if you want to quickly get up to speed on some of the recent scientific work which has been alleged to debunk freedom of the will.  Daniel Dennett gives it his endorsement--for what it's worth, which probably ain't much.

Neuroscience Study Challenges Free Will

A very interesting study challenges the notion that humans have free will.  I would love to read more about the details, specifically just how well the decision could be predicted on the basis of prior "background noise" in the brain.  But apparently the online journal the study is published in costs FIFTEEN BUCKS to access!  If I find out more I'll give an update .