Why I Don't Use the Term "Social Justice"

[We have a new major on campus: social justice.  Here's a post from a couple years ago.]


Why would anyone be opposed to social justice?  Who doesn't want to live in a just society?  I certainly do.  It's not that I oppose social justice--or justice for that matter--it's that (a) it's not clear to me what "social justice" means and (b) I'm leery of adopting a phrase which now is significantly owned by the left.

To understand social justice we must first have a handle on justice simpliciter.  So what is justice?

Retributive Punishment and Christian Forgiveness

Alexander Pruss has a recent post  which I reproduce below, expressing a number of things I have discussed here over the course of this blog's short history.  Commentary throughout.

Start with this argument:
1. Christians ought to forgive all wrongdoing.
2. Forgiving includes foregoing retribution.
3. All ought to forego retribution in the absence of [presence of?] wrongdoing.
4. Therefore, Christians ought in all cases to forego retribution.
And, yet the following also seem true:

5. Retributive justice is central to the concept of punishment.
and:
6. Punishment is often needed for the public good.

What is the Christian to do? Well, one thought is that we should weaken (1). Thomas Aquinas in his sermons on the Lord's Prayer says that we are only required to forgive those who ask us for forgiveness. (After all, Christ tells us to expect God to forgive us as we forgive others; but we do ask God for forgiveness.) Forgiving the unrepentant is supererogatory, he says. That weakens the conflict between the displayed claims. Nonetheless, there are times when the criminal justice system needs to punish someone who we have good reason to think is repentant, because the risks to society of letting her go free may be unacceptably high. Furthermore, Aquinas's modification of (1) doesn't help all that much because the supererogatory is by definition always right. So even with Aquinas's modification of (1), we still seem to get a conflict between forgiveness and the needs of the public good.

TB: One might distinguish between forgiveness as conditional, the way Pruss does here, or as unconditional, or both.  On the conditional understanding, not only am I required only to forgive those who ask, but it is impossible that forgiveness occurs without the wrongdoer admitting his wrong and asking for forgiveness.  Alternatively, we might think that forgiveness can be (at least partly) achieved by the wronged party treating the wrongdoer as having the punishment already waved even if the wrongdoer does not ask for forgiveness, or as treating the wrongdoer as if he had not committed the offense.  I favor the latter understanding (but this is a blog post and subject to revision.)  I can forgive you by waving my right to punish you for having wronged me or treating you as if you had not wronged me (even if a punishment remains in place). This does not mean either that I am required to do so or that there are instances where I should not do so (for example if I know that in doing so it would increase your unjust resentment towards me.)   But how could I forgive you while a punishment is left in place?  Read on.

Another move, and it may be the most promising, is to distinguish between the individual and the community. Forgiveness is the individual Christian's duty (or at least supererogation--but for brevity I won't consider that option any more), but there are wrongs that, on account of the public good, the community should not forgive. I think this is a quite promising option, but I am not completely convinced. One reason I am not convinced is that Catholic social teaching allows for the possibility of a Christian state, with Vatican City being an example. And there is some plausibility in thinking that the Christian state should behave rather like the Christian individual, but a Christian state has need of punishment for safeguarding the public good. Now maybe forgiveness and punishment are one of the things that varies between the Christian individual and the Christian state, so that the individual should forgive while the state sometimes is not permitted to do so. But it would be good to have another approach.

TB: I don't find this avenue promising.  Suppose you have committed a series of batteries and homicide.  In jail you come to see that you have done wrong, wish you had not done wrong, and ask for forgiveness.  The Pope forgives you and wishes your restoration to the community.  But because of deep seated vices on your part, you remain in jail, in part for your own sake and the protection of the community as well as for deterrence effect.
This also happens on a smaller scale between parents and children.  Sometimes children come to see that they have done wrong and ask for forgiveness.  The parent forgives the child but tells the child that he must remain in timeout for 20 minutes until remaining anger towards a sibling subsides; as well, one notes that it's good for the child and the siblings to know that actions have consequences.
The point: One can forgive another, and sometimes one has a duty to forgive but at the same time can also have a justifying reason to punish.  By forgive I mean treating one as if the particular wrong had not occurred.  I see no reason for thinking that an authority in a Christian state could not have a duty both to forgive and to punish.  One could treat the wrongdoer as if the particular wrong had not occurred while still recognizing the underlying vice which calls for a punishment to remain in place.

Think about sports and victory. The very concept of a fencing match cannot be understood apart from seeing it as a practice whose internal end is getting to a score of five before the opponent does. Nonetheless, it is possible to have a friendly and honorable match where no one is intentionally pursuing victory. Rather, the players are exercising their skills in excellent ways that tend to promote victory without actually seeking victory. (The clearest case may be a parent fencing with a child and hoping that the child's skills are so good that the parent will be defeated; but one can have cases where each wants the other to win.)

Similarly, perhaps, just as sports cannot be understood apart from victory, punishment cannot be understood apart from retribution.

TB: I think punishment--moreover, just punishment--can be understood apart from retribution. In part because I think Jesus forbids retribution but not punishment (moreover, it would take a powerful theory to convince me that Jesus thought parents should never punish children.)  As well, I think the basic concept of punishment pulls apart from retribution.  Here is a stab at a definition of punishment:  Punishment is harsh treatment in response to perceived wronging which by the act of the harsh treatment is meant to censure or condemn the type of act committed which is perceived to be wrong.

I say "perceived wronging" to rule out cases where one punishes unjustly--where the party is punished but was innocent.  I add that the harsh treatment is meant to censure or condemn to distinguish punishment from harsh treatments in self-defense or actions in war.  (For the harsh treatment to be meant to censure or condemn the action, though, one need not be consciously or occurently intending this as part of its end.)

This definition also has the virtue of being compatible with having various reasons for punishment.  One of those might be retribution.  Another might be deterrence of crime.  Another prevention of crime.  Another correction.  And so on.

But just as there are reasons besides victory to play, there are reasons apart from retribution to punish. In those cases, punishment is not intended by the agent. (Another example: I have argued that sex cannot be understood apart from its reproductive end; however, agents can permissibly refrain from pursuing reproduction in particular cases of sex.) This suggests that perhaps we should weaken premise (2) of the initial argument to:

7. Forgiving includes refraining from pursuit of retribution.

TB: I don't understand the difference between "forgoing retribution" in 2 and "refraining from pursuit of retribution" in 7.  

The weakened argument only yields the conclusion that Christians ought to refrain from pursuing retribution. But refraining from pursuit of retribution may well be compatible with punishment. And the public goods that render punishment necessary need not include retribution--retribution can be left to the God who says: "Vengeance is mine".
This may be a part of why John Paul II says in Evangelium Vitae that for the death penalty to be justified in some particular (and presumably very rare) case it must be justified on grounds of protection of society. In other words, it is the protection of society, rather than retribution, that is to be sought.

TB:  "But refraining from pursuit of retribution may well be compatible with punishment."  I agree.  Not only can one punish while not pursuing retribution, one can justly punish while not pursuing retribution.  I reject 5 above.

Which raises the question, what is retribution?  Retribution is punishment for the sake of "evening the cosmic scale." One has been wronged n-degrees.  One is thereby to be given harsh treatment by a measure of n.  This seems to me wrong.  In wronging someone one loses one's right not to be punished.  Another is sometimes permitted to render harsh treatment up to a measure of n, but one is not required to do so.  There are overriding reasons which justify forgoing retribution: reconciliation, protection of society, etc.  See this post for several reasons for punishment.

"retribution can be left to the God who says: "Vengeance is mine"."

TB: Perhaps.  But perhaps even God punishes but not for the sake of retribution.  Perhaps we should understand "vengeance" as well as "jealousy" applied to God analogically or metaphorically.

On Citizens not Assassinating Abortionists

Terrible Irony

Abortions kill innocent humans.  Now suppose an abortionist knows that he is killing innocent humans.  Such a person deserves to be killed.  Justice (prima facie) permits the killing of the abortionist--at least by one who has legitimate authority to do so.
Ordinary citizens sometimes kill murderers and do so permissibly.  If a school shooting is taking place and an ordinary citizen with a gun finds that the only reasonable way to stop the senseless killings is to shoot the mass murderer, the citizen is within his legal and moral rights to do so.  In fact, as I have argued more than once in this blog, justice (and love) in some cases seem to demand it.

Why then shouldn't ordinary citizens take matters into their own hands and kill abortionists?  One reason, of course, is that to do such is illegal.  One will go to jail.  But are there moral reasons beyond the pragmatic reason of not going to jail?

What if a citizen finds himself in an abortion clinic where the abortionist is about to "crush" and "crunch" a baby, in part to pay for some shiny new rims for her Lamborghini?  Is the vigilante not justified, whereas the person who stops the school shooter is?  Why is the vigilante not justified?

I think he is not.  Here is a sketch of an argument in support of that thought.  One reason for thinking not has to do with the fact that abortions are a systemic practice and abortions are legal (at least some) given legislation passed by a legitimate governing authority.  One has a moral duty to abide by criminal laws promulgated by a morally legitimate political authority, where abiding by such laws does not commit one to doing something that is unjust (on the very reasonable assumption that legitimate governments sometimes pass unjust laws).  In killing an abortionist, one only prolongs the time it will take for abortions to occur--killing an abortionist in a society like ours will result in a dead abortionist as well as dead babies.  There are plenty of other abortionists who will step in to take her place.  In addition, killing an abortionist is not like killing a school shooter in the act of shooting.  Abortions are planned out in advance and do not take place randomly in the eyes of the community.   There are other means one could take to stop the abortionist.  In fact, there are much better means which do not involve killing another human. 

Killing another human being should always be the last resort when it comes to stopping other killings.  Assassinating an abortionist sends a signal to the community that the government is not the final authority (this side of Luna) in matters of life and death.  To do such promotes anarchy against one's government; and the best arguments against anarchy focus on showing that anarchies cannot protect the rights of people more generally better than the government.  The vigilante lacks the moral authority to take lethal action, but acts as if he is a morally legitimate authority and that the government is not.  The same cannot be said for the person who stops a random mass shooting--for one, he has the legal authority to do so from a morally legitimate government.

But what if the U.S. government is not a (morally) legitimate authority, as some anarchists, libertarians, and Marxists have argued?  What if the U.S. government has de facto but not de jure authority?  Then the above argument would need modification. 

The Graduation Day Degree Gap

Unsocial injustice!  Discrimination!

Having a Family/Private Education Are Unfair Advantages

Philosopher Adam Swift knows that having a family gives children an advantage.  But lockstep with progressive ideology hellbent on upsetting traditional values, he follows it to its (il)logical conclusion: for the sake of the egalitarian utopia, we should be concerned about reading bedtime stories to our children because it gives them an unfair advantage; furthermore, private education should be abolished.  This is not the Onion, folks.  This is reality.

Read the entire excerpt::

‘I got interested in this question because I was interested in equality of opportunity,’ he says.

‘I had done some work on social mobility and the evidence is overwhelmingly that the reason why children born to different families have very different chances in life is because of what happens in those families.’

‘One way philosophers might think about solving the social justice problem would be by simply abolishing the family. If the family is this source of unfairness in society then it looks plausible to think that if we abolished the family there would be a more level playing field.’   

‘It’s the children’s interest in family life that is the most important,’ says Swift. ‘From all we now know, it is in the child’s interest to be parented, and to be parented well. Meanwhile, from the adult point of view it looks as if there is something very valuable in being a parent.’ [So instead of abolishing the family...]

‘We could prevent elite private schooling without any real hit to healthy family relationships, whereas if we say that you can’t read bedtime stories to your kids because it’s not fair that some kids get them and others don’t, then that would be too big a hit at the core of family life.’

‘I don’t think parents reading their children bedtime stories should constantly have in their minds the way that they are unfairly disadvantaging other people’s children, but I think they should have that thought occasionally,’ quips Swift.

‘It’s true that in the societies in which we live, biological origins do tend to form an important part of people’s identities, but that is largely a social and cultural construction. [TB: Care to give an argument for that?] So you could imagine societies in which the parent-child relationship could go really well even without there being this biological link.’

‘Nothing in our theory assumes two parents: there might be two, there might be three, and there might be four,’ says Swift.

‘We do want to defend the family against complete fragmentation and dissolution,’ he says. ‘If you start to think about a child having 10 parents, then that’s looking like a committee rearing a child; there aren’t any parents there at all.’  [TB: Oh, good, seems we're in excellent hands.  Thanks for pulling us back from the ledge of lunacy.  The rational cutoff, according to our family expert, isn't two but nine.]

As I have noted numerous times on this blog, progressives like Swift conflate ("social") justice with fairness as well as equality.  But justice, fairness, and equality are not the same.  Judgments about fairness and equality necessarily involve making comparisons, whereas judgments about justice need not.  I can judge that I have unjustly given you too little money simply by noting that I have given you less than what I promised for the work that you did irrespective of what anyone else has made. You can judge whether I gave you an unjust grade simply by looking at your work and my rubric in the course syllabus irrespective of whether I gave a fair/equal distribution of grades to the entire class (e.g. everyone including you got a "C").  

Instead of fretting about reading bedtime stories to his children, perhaps Swift should consider reading them this Bible story.

Parable of the Laborers in the Vineyard: Justice is Not Equality

I have posted numerous times on justice and equality (for instance here, here, and here).  It's a theme that runs through this blog.

The liberal view on justice is often that justice is equality.  Often this takes the form of justice being understood in terms of equal outcomes.  Are there a lot of white males in the administration?  Injustice!  Wage inequality? Injustice!  The first link above addresses that mindset.  Sometimes justice as equality takes the form of equal treatment.  To be just is to treat people or be treated by them equally.

This too I think is incorrect.  What all forms of justice as equality have in common is that the idea of justice is a COMPARATIVE notion.  Justice is a relation of equality that holds between a group or society wherein two or more people are treated equally or have equal outcomes.  And one only knows that a certain event, action, or state of affairs is just when one compares the action, event, etc. with actions, events, etc. done to another party.

I think that is wrong and I think the Biblical view of justice is that it is simply rendering or being rendered one's due.  I can treat you justly or unjustly and can know that I've treated you justly or unjustly regardless of whether I make a comparison with myself, you, and others.

I give everyone A's on the test. Have I acted justly?  Unjustly?  Has justice been served?  There is no way to tell simply by taking note of the fact that everyone has received the same outcome.  Rather, what I need to know is whether students have received what they were due--that is, whether they all had rights to an A and whether I had a duty to give them all A's.

I just recently reread the parable of the laborers in the vineyard in Matthew 20 and I think it better supports the view of justice as rendering or being rendered one's due rather than justice as equality.  Below the fold I reproduce the story and give my analysis.

Too Many Old White Men at School

A reader of the blog (a faculty member at a university) chimes in with the following story:

I was in a Dean’s office earlier today, meeting about some matter, when an email arrived in her in-box detailing the following: another Dean was stepping down. Let’s call the Dean I'm in the office with “Dean.” Here is our commentary about the email starting with what "Dean" said:

Dean: “Awwww…that’s sad.”

Me: “Why?”

Dean: “Well, because she’s like the only non-old-white-male Dean we have.”

Me: “Uhhh…so?”

"Dean" then goes to her computer, looks up all of the Academic Deans and goes down the list, saying (repeatedly): “White man. White man. White man. White man…”

Me (again): “And your point is…?”

Dean (looking at me incredulously): “You seriously don’t think that’s a problem?!?!”

Me: “Nope. Not at all.”

Dean: “Yep, that’s what any white man would say.”

Me: “Stereotype much?”

Note from TB: The Dean thinks there is a problem.  Is there a problem?  Is the problem with the school or with the Dean?  What is the problem exactly?  Exercise for the reader: precisely explain what the problem is and then give a cogent argument that there is a problem here.

Did Ray Rice's Girlfriend Deserve to be Punched in the Face?

That was the first question that I asked aloud in the room of people watching PC_SPN this summer when I first heard the story.  Does that question shock you?  It shouldn't.  Allow me to explain.

"Equality doesn't mean Justice": An Analysis of a Picture Going Viral

Have a look at this picture that has been circulating of which I do not know the origin.  What do you see?  What is this picture trying to convey?  What does it mean?

Having no knowledge of the origin, I offer my own interpretation in narrative form which I take to be a reasonable one (but perhaps not the only reasonable one):

Justice is Neither Fairness nor Equality

From a eulogy for philosopher Sidney Morgenbesser:

Years after the Columbia riots, where [Sidney] was clobbered by the police, he was being questioned for a panel for jury duty. One of the questions was, “Have you ever been treated unjustly or unfairly by the police?” His reply was classic: “I’ve been treated unjustly but not unfairly. They were clobbering everybody.”

Am I Unjust in Not Giving Extra Credit?

I don't give extra credit, mostly for practical reasons.  If students know that I regularly give extra credit, then they will have reason to slack off on other "credit" assignments. This creates more work for me and I have plenty of grading to do already.  Furthermore, I have put a lot of thought into the "credit" assignments and think that it is good for students to put forth a modicum of effort on these assignments.  Also, there is no principled end to extra credit giving, as far as I can see.  If students don't do the "credit" assignments nor the first "extra credit" assignment, should I give another?  And another?  Should I give them extra credit indefinitely?  The solution seems to me to cut the infinite regress off right at the stem.

But should I give extra credit?  Or should I not give extra credit?  If the "should" is a matter of whether it's pragmatic, I have already given my reasons why I think I should not.  But if the "should" is a matter of morality or justice, this is a different question.  Am I unjust in not giving extra credit?  Or is giving extra credit unjust?  Here I will only address the former question: