Biblical God vs. Perfect Being Theology

A nice discussion between a perfect being theologian/philosopher and a presuppositionalist (of sorts) going on here.

An Argument that Canonization is Ongoing

These aren't fully digested thoughts and I retain the right to recant but here goes:

Would a Discovered Letter of Paul's Be Included in the Bible?

A few brief thoughts...

The Greatest Natural Theologian Alive

...was just at my alma mater, Purdue.  That's according to Dale Tuggy. Here is his post with links to the conference:

In September of 2014 I was privileged to attend a conference in honor of the greatest living natural theologian. For the uninitiated, this is what “natural theology” is (also here). The initiated hold Swinburne in awe because of his writings.  Richard Swinburne has produced an unparalleled string of carefully argued, in many cases ground-breaking books in philosophy of religion and in analytic theology (see the links below).

Many “big guns” of philosophy of religion came out to present at the conference, and to a person they related how Swinburne had inspired them to think deeply and carefully about various philosophical and theological issues. For my part, his The Christian God was the book that inspired and provoked me to look deeply into the issue of the Trinity. Professor Swinburne has a manly way of taking a stand on hard issues, fashion be damned. You may agree or disagree, but you will think.

David is God: Follow-up

An anonymous commenter asks what I think the upshot is from Dale Tuggy's recent post I put up on the blog.  Instead of commenting back, I decided that this required a post of its own.

A Critique of Roger Olson's Critique of Scholastic Evangelical Theology

Baylor's Truett Theological Seminary professor, Roger Olson, has a blog post here with his objections to "Scholastic Evangelical Theology" and support for his alternative "Intuitive Evangelical Theology."  More on that in a moment.  But first, what kind of animal is Scholastic Evangelical Theology and its intuitive counterpart?

As I would define Scholastic Evangelical Theology it is simply theology by an Evangelical which tries to take into account all  the available evidence when rendering a judgment about the nature of God, God's actions in the world, and the relations of the world with God.  It's the most systematic theology one can imagine. Described in that way, I find the discipline hard to resist.

Bare Cross or Crucifix?

Catholics, Orthodox, many Lutherans, and some Anglicans display and sometimes wear crucifixes.  Some Lutherans and Anglicans don't, and virtually no Methodists, Presbyterians, Baptists, and Evangelicals more generally wear or display crucifixes.  Instead they typically display or wear an empty cross.

Why do we in this latter group reject crucifixes?

From what I can tell, Luther was down with crucifixes but Calvin and Zwingli were not (though Calvin and Zwingli held that certain religious symbols--perhaps crucifixes, I don't know--were OK if in one's house).

Four reasons against crucifixes that I can glean are:


1. Exodus 20:4's prohibition against graven images

2. Having images in church tends toward idolatry
3. An empty cross better symbolizes Christ's resurrection
4. Galatians 6:14 May I never boast except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world.

Regarding 1:
Now, Exodus 20:4, taken at face value, rings of Islam: you shall not make any images of any thing period.   But Christians have long been against this extreme type of iconoclasm and have held a more nuanced view in interpreting Exodus 20:4-5 in light of the New Testament.  If Exodus 20:4 rules out crucifixes, it would seem to rule out any statues of Jesus, paintings of Jesus, and the light-bulb-glowing-Christmas-baby-Jesus.

Regarding 2:
This is hard to prove.  Catholics, Lutherans, etc. certainly argue that they are not worshiping crucifixes and don't treat them as idols.  Perhaps in practice this does not always hold but that's definitely their view.  Of course, the threat on the other side is a tendency towards Gnosticism, thinking of God as completely transcendent and forgetting the Incarnational God.  There's also a tendency towards idolatry with respect to the Bible and militant, individualistic Biblicism.  I don't know how many times I've heard pastors and other Christians in the last few years say that "the Bible IS TRUTH" as if Jesus is the Bible!  At any rate, even if crucifixes are sometimes idolized, that's not a good argument against them in principle.

Regarding 3:
The Biblical symbol of the Resurrection is not the cross but the empty tomb.  An empty cross is no better symbol of the Resurrection than a crucifix since the cross was empty before the crucifixion.

Regarding 4:
We should probably take "cross" as a metaphor for the crucifixion or a synecdoche for Christ on the cross.  A cross without Christ is pointless, just as His death without the resurrection is pointless (as Paul was well aware).

Now for some Biblical passages that might be taken to favor crucifixes:

1 Cor. 1  23 but we preach Christ crucified: a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, 24 but to those whom God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.

1 Cor. 2   2 For I resolved to know nothing while I was with you except Jesus Christ and him crucified.

Gal. 3:1  You foolish Galatians! Who has bewitched you? Before your very eyes Jesus Christ was clearly portrayed as crucified.

Col. 1 15 The Son is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation.

Hebrews 1 3 The Son is the radiance of God’s glory and the exact representation of his being, sustaining all things by his powerful word.

John 20 27 Then he said to Thomas, “Put your finger here; see my hands. Reach out your hand and put it into my side. [Gross!  Gross?] Stop doubting and believe.”

Rev. 5:6 Then I saw a Lamb, looking as if it had been slain, standing at the center of the throne, encircled by the four living creatures and the elders.

Obviously there's no knock down argument here for displaying or wearing crucifixes, but if we're going to allow some physical representations or symbols of Jesus (beyond symbols in a natural language like "Jesus"), it's hard to see why a three dimensional representation of Jesus dying on the cross is particularly problematic.  We're not Muslims after all!

One last argument (I'm sure there are others) against crucifixes is that the crucifix for Catholics might also be symbolic of Christ's perpetual sacrifice in the Eucharist (which some Protestants reject appealing to Hebrews 10:10 as a proof text among other things).  I don't know if that's true of Catholics, but there's nothing inherent in a crucifix suggestive of a perpetual sacrifice, just as there's nothing inherent in the baby Jesus in a manger scene suggesting that Jesus is perpetually a baby.

Unfortunately, there seems to me a general lack of theological reflection on art in Evangelical circles more generally (and an ignorant rejection of all things Roman Catholic as well).  Here  is a great place to start.  Here is a very introductory work on iconography (which Evangelicals should find appealing; I know my brother-the-pastor found it helpful as did I).

As always, thoughts and objections are welcome.

Would Jesus Support the Death Penalty?

Jonathan Merritt, writing for The Atlantic, asks, "Would Jesus Support the Death Penalty?"  For Christians, the question is equivalent to, "Would God Support the Death Penalty?" which raises the more general question, "Should We Support the Death Penalty?"

What do we mean by this question?  We might be asking whether capital punishment (CP) is permissible (in theory) or whether it's intrinsically wrong.  We might be asking whether it's not only permissible, but also obligatory.  We might also be asking whether, even if permissible, CP is overall good or better than alternative punishments for certain crimes.  Or we might be skipping past these questions to the question of whether we should vote for legislators who would implement it.

That it's permissible (in theory) seems to be well supported by the following propositions, one of which only believers in the Western faiths will find appealing:

1. In the Old Testament, God assigns capital punishment for certain offenses; thus there have been times when CP is permissible; thus, in theory, it's permissible.
2. If one knowingly murders an innocent person, one gives up one's right not to have one's life taken in return; if one gives up one's right not to have one's life taken in return for a murder, then CP is permissible in theory; thus CP is permissible in theory.

I find 1 and 2 hard to resist, but Merritt seems opposed to them and against CP in theory as well as in practice. Let's see some of his evidence against it:

Christians who support the death penalty often cite passages from the Old Testament that allowed for capital punishment. But Jesus told his followers not to observe the Jewish law that allowed for retributive justice: “You have heard that it was said, ‘Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.’ But I tell you, do not resist an evil person. If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also.”

As theologian Benjamin Corey says, “It is not possible to argue a Christian case in support of the death penalty while citing passages from the Hebrew scriptures, because this will put one at odds with Jesus himself.”

Theologian Benjamin Corey appears to be flirting dangerously close to Marcionism: Is it "not POSSIBLE to argue [for] a Christian case in support of the death penalty while citing passages from Hebrew Scripture"?  Surely that is putting things too strongly.  Here are possible interpretations of Jesus's remarks on lex talionis, not all of which seem impossible to square with a proper interpretation of the Old Testament:

1. Jesus is denying that retributive justice is permissible.
2. Jesus is denying that retributive justice is obligatory.
3. Jesus is denying that retributive justice is obligatory and permissible.
4. Jesus is denying that retributive justice is obligatory and permissible for individuals not acting in the capacity of a state official.
And so forth.

My own view, which I shall not argue for here, is that Jesus is denying that one should ever act simply for the sake of retribution.  Jesus is focusing on the heart and the reasons why we do things.  He is against a certain mindset of reciprocity.  If that is correct, then Jesus is not here denying that it's ever permissible for a state to put people to death (which is a good thing, since the opposite would be hard to square with Romans).

Many forget that Jesus once served as a one-man jury on a death-penalty case. In a famous New Testament story, an adulterous woman was dragged to Jesus’ feet. The woman was guilty of a capital offense and had been caught in the act by at least one witness. The law mandated her death but Jesus prescribed a different response: “Let whoever is without sin cast the first stone.” He was teaching that only a perfect being—only God—should have power over death and life.

The problem with taking this passage to rule out CP gets to a problem that CP abolitionists almost always ignore in this discussion: If this story rules out CP, it would seem to rule out all punishments as well.   Let those of you without sin sentence someone to life in prison.  Let those of you without sin sentence someone to five years in prison.  Let those of you without sin....  I take that as a reductio ad absurdum of the argument which interprets the passage as condemning any instances of CP.

There’s no reason to believe that Jesus or these early Christian leaders would feel any different about the matter today with our broken justice system. The most reliable predictor of whether someone will be sentenced to death is not the amount of evidence, but the race of the victim. Geography is also an important factor, which is why a handful of counties are responsible for most of the executions in the United States. And then of course wealth is a factor, as almost all death-row inmates could not afford their own attorney. 

No doubt race and money have some influence in legal matters (but the statistics he cites fail, by themselves, to give an actual argument that the explanation for the majority of the statistics is unjust discrimination). But of course there are all sorts of irrelevant factors that influence prosecutors and juries: how attractive one is, whether one shows emotional displays of empathy in the court room, whether one is a woman (far fewer women convicted of murder receive the death penalty compared to men), and so on.  But this does nothing to show that CP, any more than any other punishment, is impermissible.  At best, what the statistics show (if they can show that there is unjust discrimination), is that there are jurisdictions which need to correct their punitive practices more generally.

There are also practical reasons to oppose the death penalty. [TB: Wasn't the stuff about race a practical reason?] Studies show that death-penalty cases are as much as 10 times more expensive to adjudicate than comparable cases. And the risk of executing a person unnecessarily is real.  

Of COURSE it costs more to adjudicate CP cases, but that's a GOOD thing.  The reason it costs more is because of all the appeals, appeals which are there to make sure the person is guilty.  Yes, "the risk of executing an [innocent] person unnecessarily is real," but so the risk of imprisoning a person FOR LIFE who, unlike the person on death row, is not afforded multiple appeals.

Following Claiborne’s encounter with Haslam, I joined Claiborne in visiting death-row inmates atRiverbend Maximum Security Institution. I spent more than an hour conversing with these men, four of whom have execution dates scheduled. I could feel the weight of desperate prayers and desperate pleas of desperate prisoners.
While I sat talking with them, Dear’s words came to mind: “Killing people who kill people is not the way to show that killing people is wrong.”

Question: Would they have been praying if they were sentenced to life in prison?  Perhaps we'll never know, but the above should dispel the notion that there is any merit to the argument that some U.S. Christians give about "needing more time to repent."

It is true that murdering people who murder people is not the only way to show that murdering people is wrong.  One could also show that murder is wrong by having them watch a murder on Youtube.  (Of course, most people don't NEED to be shown it's wrong to know that it's wrong!)  But not punishing people EVER (which Merrick's argument seems to entail) is also not a way to show people that what they did was wrong.  What eliminating punishments would do is to mislead people into thinking that actions don't have consequences.

It brings to mind one of the best scenes from Breaking Bad (no major spoilers here):

So do I believe in CP?  Yes, I guess I do.  I think it should be rare.  It should only be for acts so heinous that society puts its ultimate stamp of diapprobation on them as a way of standing in solidarity with those who have received horrific acts of injustice.  Stoning to death for prostitution wouldn't meet that bar; but abducting, torturing, shooting, and burying alive a teenage girl would.

For more on CP see the Maverick here:

Death Penalty, Abortion, and Certainty
and here:
Capital Punishment and the Difference Between Conservatives and Leftists

Just War Theory in Sprinkle's Book "Fight"

This is the penultimate post in my series on Preston Sprinkle's book, Fight: A Christian Case for Nonviolence.  I plan to have one more post with links to all the previous ones.

Since I've already expressed my objections to what I take to be the core, Christian pacifist arguments of the book, much of what I've said before will apply to the appendix on Just War Theory--the theory which holds that some wars are just and traditionally lays out seven criteria, all of which should be upheld for a warring party to be on the whole just.  Theorists disagree about the precise criteria, but Sprinkle's list is a fair enough representation: (1) Just Cause, (2) Right Authority, (3) Right Intention, (4) Reasonable Chance of Success, (5) Last Resort, (6) Proportionate Means, and (7) Noncombatant Immunity.  Consistent with the rest of the book, Sprinkle thinks Christians should not fight in wars.  Since I don't think his case in previous chapters for total nonviolence for Christians is convincing, I remain resolved in my belief that there is merit in the traditional Just War Theory (which is really a family of theories). Nonetheless, I will take up a few passages from this section and reply to them for good measure:

David Platt and John MacArthur on Heaven and Near Death Experiences

A brief word about the arguments put forward here:
http://www.radical.net/blog/2014/04/heaven-is-for-real/
and here:
http://www.answersingenesis.org/articles/am/v9/n2/visits-to-heaven

Platte and MacArthur (hereafter P&M) REALLY don't like all the books on near death experiences (NDE's) wherein people recount their alleged trips to heaven or hell.  I'm not a big fan either, but mostly for reasons other than theirs.  I'm skeptical primarily because some of the longer accounts I've encountered have internal inconsistencies (i.e., the story asserts one thing that is later implicitly or explicitly denied in the story) as well as external inconsistencies (e.g., with other NDE stories, with Christian doctrine, and so forth).   P&M, though, seem to think that there is something wrong (heretical?) in principle with claiming to know anything extra-Biblical about heaven (or hell).

For instance, M says this:
The New Testament adds much to our understanding of heaven (and hell), but we are still not permitted to add our own subjective ideas and experience-based conclusions to what God has specifically revealed through His inerrant Word. Indeed, we are forbidden in all spiritual matters to go beyond what is written (1 Corinthians 4:6).

What does it mean to "go beyond what is written"?  What does it mean to be "not permitted to add our own subjective ideas and experience-based conclusions to what God has specifically revealed?"  It's not perfectly clear what exactly M means by those words, but what is clear from the context is that M thinks there is something wrong with the NDE books in principle.  You just shouldn't claim to know extra-Biblical stuff like these people are claiming.

But what is wrong with the following:  I believe (and believe I have excellent reason to believe) that God has performed miracles in my life and others that I know.  But, let's be honest, I'm not exactly in the Bible!!  Nor is there anything in the Bible that guarantees that such and such miracle today was caused by God.  There is some scriptural evidence (e.g. there's reason to believe from Scripture that God is in the business of healing), but I can't simply look in the Bible to see if God healed this person I know.  Yet there's nothing wrong with believing that God did such a thing. So why think that if I wrote a book about my life and included miracles by God that I'm somehow violating a Scriptural mandate?  I see no good reason to think this way.  But then why think reporting something about heaven is off limits?  If God heals my son, then it's true that God in heaven healed my son.  If I know God healed my son, then I know something true about heaven, namely, that God in heaven healed my son.

Let us also note that none of these books are thought to BE SCRIPTURE (which would be heretical) or to contain propositions which the authors advocate should BECOME CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.  There's no adding to doctrine or scripture being advocated in these books. The authors are reporting additional things they (purportedly) take to be true about heaven (which, nonetheless, we might have good reason to be skeptical about).  Perhaps some of these authors have illicit reasons for saying what they do (e.g., perhaps some are in it for the money), but perhaps some genuinely believe their experiences were veridical and think that these stories will help bolster the faith of others.  I get the impression that P&M think the only legitimate mode of theologizing is to open up a Bible (King James only?) and simply read it out loud.

Another reason P&M think there is something wrong with these books is because they think there's good evidence that no one has been to heaven except for Jesus.  For instance, M cites the following (P adds Proverbs 30:4 which is similar):
John 3:13 says, “No one has ascended into heaven except he who descended from heaven, the Son of Man.” And John 1:18 says, “No one has seen God at any time.”

I don't know exactly what to make of John 3:13, but Jesus can't be saying that he's already ascended into heaven, which a straightforward reading of the verse suggests.  So our interpretation can't be that straightforward. Still, suppose this passage rules out all bodily ascensions (adding curiosity about where the bodies of Elijah and Enoch went).  That's still not inconsistent with someone's soul being in heaven until the resurrection of the body (e.g., the one thief on the cross).  So if ascension can mean bodily ascension, then John 3 and 1 aren't obviously inconsistent with some assertions in these popular books.  But even if the souls of people aren't in heaven, it's still an open question whether they had visions of being in heaven without being materially or immaterially present.  I don't know what would rule that out in principle.

Much more needs to be said, but the matter is complicated.  It's more complicated than P&M let on.

Jesus's Example and The Attacker-at-the-Door in Sprinkle's Book "Fight"

This is the sixth post on Sprinkle's book Fight: A Christian Case for Nonviolence.  Since I've already dealt systematically with what I take to be the major issues of the book, I now begin to finish off this series by turning to a few miscellaneous passages that have been overlooked thus far.

#1: Violence and Jesus's Example

Sprinkle's Book "Fight" and CHRISTIAN Pacifism

This is the fifth post on Sprinkle's book, Fight: A Christian Case for Nonviolence.

An alternative title which would have been just as fitting is Fight: A Case for Nonviolent Christians.  For Sprinkle's pacifism condemns violence for Christians, but he leaves open the possibility that certain acts of violence may be permissible for non-Christians.  Here are a few quotations to make good on that last claim:

"So far, I've argued that killing is wrong and therefore killing the attacker is wrong.  In other words, killing is a moral absolute: Christians should never do it" (p. 222).

"The big question, of course, is whether a Christian can use violence as a police officer.  No, I don't think he or she can" (p. 248).

 Now, some interpreters say that Jesus's Sermon doesn't apply to governments, only to individuals.  There is certainly some truth to this.  After all, Jesus doesn't preach His Sermon to the Roman Empire or the American government.  However, the Sermon does apply to all citizens of God's kingdom, and it should saturate all areas of life. It would make no sense to say that the Sermon on the Mount is fine for individual Christians--even better for the church--but that it doesn't apply to Christians in the government" (p. 140).

"Romans 13 does not speak of Rome's warfare policy against foreign nations, but of its police and judicial action toward its own citizens.  Paul's phrase "bear the sword" (v. 4) refers to police action within a government's jurisdiction, not warfare outside its territory (p. 167)...Paul says that God's wrath and vengeance are carried out through Rome, and he has just commanded the church not to carry out such wrath and vengeance.  Vengeance is God's business, not ours.  We don't need to avenge evil, because God will.  And one way that God will is through governing authorities" (p. 170).

"In Genesis 9:5, God seems to allow the death penalty for murder" (p. 42).

"While God allowed Israel to participate in some wars, He never allowed His people to revel in the carnage the way their neighbors did" (p. 68).

Now, I don't want to give the impression that Sprinkle has a settled view with respect to the morality of non-Christians killing (or committing acts of violence more generally).  He is pretty coy about this issue, and this is one of the places where I wish he would've been clearer and would've said whether he thinks some non-Christian violence is permissible, impermissible, or that he's agnostic about the matter.  At any rate, what is pretty clear is that he thinks that Christians are called to forego all violence even if, perhaps, non-Christians are not.

Why, though, should we think that such an important moral demand is not universal?  Child sacrifice, stealing what one doesn't need to survive, adultery, murder, and so forth are all universally impermissible--no one should commit such acts.  Why think that violence isn't permissible for Christians but might be permissible for non-Christians?

Sprinkle's Book "Fight" and Double Effect

This is the third post on Preston Sprinkle's book, Fight: A Christian Case for Nonviolence.

In a prior post I discussed how Sprinkle's definition of violence includes an intent to harm and I mentioned how he appears not to stick with this definition throughout.  I ended by briefly noting how a discussion of the "Principle of Double Effect" would have mitigated this problem.  Here I want to discuss that principle and how it bears on his book.

The Principle of Double Effect (its earliest robust formulation often attributed to Aquinas) holds that some action A that has some evil E as a consequence is (at least) permissible if and only if the (a) action is itself neutral or good (b) there is some good G intended (c) E is not disproportionately evil compared with the goodness of G and (d) E is not intended as an end or a means of bringing about G.

Clause (a) rules out actions which, by their very nature, are evil.  Clause (b) rules out there being no good intention.  Clause (c) rules out cases where the evil consequences of an action outweigh the good. And clause (d) specifies that an evil not be intended as the means to the good or an intended result of the action. This last clause, though, allows that E is the means (or a means) to bring about G, but E cannot be intended as a means of E.

Now consider the following two cases where the Principle is applied:

Case #1: Harvesting organs
Dr. Smith knows that Jones will not survive unless he has another heart and a liver.  Sally has a good heart and Mary has a good liver.  Dr. Smith murders Sally and Mary so that he can harvest the organs for Jones.  The action in this case was not permissible.  It violated clauses (c) and (d) and probably clause (a) as well (depending on how the action is to be described).

Case #2: Upping the Speed Limit
Governor Smith is considering whether to sign or veto a bill upping the speed limit on certain roads.  He receives good evidence that upping the speed limit from 60 mph to 65 mph will increase the state's economy.  In addition, 95% of the population are for it.  Nonetheless, he also has good evidence that upping the speed limit will result in 20-30 more traffic fatalities per year.  After weighing the costs and benefits, Governor Smith signs the bill, intending the effect of improving the economy and pleasing his constituents while foreseeing (in all likelihood) that there will be more traffic fatalities but not intending either those fatalities or that the legislation as a means to that end.  Governor Smith has acted in way that is at least permissible (but perhaps has also acted justly).

I believe in the Principle of Double Effect, in part because I'm a deontologist and think that one's intentions matter and not just the consequences.  In addition, because so many of our actions/inactions do have foreseeable evil effects (like the one above), rejecting the principle would seem to me to result in moral paralysis, wherein moral deliberation about whether to act or not would become darn near impossible.

Application to Sprinkle's "Fight":

Another Argument For Annihilationism

Here is an argument for Annihilationism which might be used to try to avoid denying the following love principle:

L:  Any action of God's towards someone S who can be loved must be consistent with that act being an act of love towards S.

And the argument also tries to avoid the problems I've mentioned in the previous posts with annihilation being an unloving [non-loving] action towards someone (by adopting premise 7 below).

1. There is someone S who God knows would forever reject him.
2. If God knows S would forever reject him, at some point S becomes incapable of receiving God's love.
3. If 2 and 3, then at some point S can in no way be loved by God.
4. Thus, at some point S can in no way be loved by God. [from 1, 2, 3]
5. But if at some point S can in no way be loved by God, then God could act towards S in a way that is unloving.
6. Thus God could act towards S in a way that is unloving. [from 4, 5]
7. The annihilation of S would be an action towards S that is unloving.
8. Thus God could annihilate S. [from 6,7]

The first thing to say about the argument is that it doesn't go on to say that God would annihilate S.  One could argue that God would because he does on Scriptural grounds, but I find the Scriptural arguments for annihilationism no stronger than arguments for either universal salvation or the traditional view of everlasting punishment.  And I'm not interested in debating that here.

One might be able to get to the "would" from the "could" on utilitarian grounds, but utilitarianism is false, and I don't want to argue about that either.

I think probably the thing to say is that justice simply demands it, but I wouldn't know how to argue for that in such a way as to rule out the live possibility of both universalism and the traditional view without giving up the above argument.  (Of course one could also reject 7 in the argument, but I've previously said why I think that is incoherent).  So let me just talk about the two premises that I find problematic.

Why think 2 is true?  It seems to confuse the temporal with the modal.  For why couldn't it be the case that someone forever freely chooses to reject God all the while being capable of accepting God?

Premise 3 is also highly suspect.  Why think a deep, unrequited love is not possible?  

C.S. Lewis's Annihilationism

In C.S. Lewis's Great Divorce (as well as other writings) Lewis seems to entertain a kind of annihilationism.  But the occupation of hell and the sort of annihilation which occurs, according to Lewis is voluntary:

There are only two kinds of people – those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done’ to God or those to whom God in the end says, ‘Thy will be done.’ All that are in Hell choose it… No soul that seriously and constantly desires joy will ever miss it.’

As Lewis sees things (or at least as the "narrator" of The Great Divorce sees things), hell is a place of punishment where people ultimately choose to go.  And out of God's grace, God allows people to continue to do their own will after they die.  The punishment is a natural result of refusing to submit one's own will to the will of God. The illustrations he presents are meant to show that doing our own will apart from God's leads to a road of destruction.  And it is we who willfully bring that destruction upon ourselves.

The road to destruction comes in degrees.  Lewis, it would seem, has in mind man as a "rational animal"--humans are animals with a capacity of reason having both an intellect and a will to choose among various ends.  But the rational element is something that can not only gradually be lost but completely lost, leaving behind the mere animal.  The following illustration of a lady who "grumbles" captures the view nicely:

     "Aye, but ye misunderstand me. The question is whether she is a grumbler, or only a grumble. If there is a real woman-even the least trace of one-still there inside the grumbling, it can be brought to life again. If there's one wee spark under all those ashes, we'll blow it till the whole pile is red and clear. But if there's nothing but ashes we'll not go on blowing them in our own eyes forever. They must be swept up."
     "But how can there be a grumble without a grumbler?"
     "The whole difficulty of understanding Hell is that the thing to be understood is so nearly Nothing. But ye'll have had experiences . . . it begins with a grumbling mood, and yourself still distinct from it: perhaps criticising it. And yourself, in a dark hour, may will that mood, embrace it. Ye can repent and come out of it again. But there may come a day when you can do that no longer. Then there will be no you left to criticise the mood, nor even to enjoy it, but just the grumble itself going on forever like a machine." 

On this account there is the person (let's call her), Nancy, and through habitual grumbling, grumbling becomes her sole pursuit.  Through years of succumbing to her desire to grumble, her one and only end becomes to grumble.  But then with only one end (Lewis seems to be suggesting), there is nothing else to choose and all she can do is fulfill her animalistic impulse to grumble.  

Thus spoke Lewis.  But what exactly are we to make of Nancy?  I'll assume Nancy was once a person and that the animal that remains is not a person.  So Nancy was a person, and a person presumably has an ability to choose to act on desires other than merely animalistic ones.  Did she cease to exist or is she now a mere animal?  Lewis seems to leave us with the following options w/respect to what we should think of Nancy:
1. Nancy ceases to be and all that remains is an animal not identical to Nancy or 
2. Nancy (the once rational- animal) becomes a mere animal.  

This raises numerous questions.  Here are six:  (a) Is a change of this sort possible? (b) Even if it is possible for this kind of change to occur (say, by God), do I have the kind of nature such that it's possible that I could annihilate myself?  (c) If this is possible, would God allow it?  (d) Is Lewis committing himself to the view that animals are basically machines?  (e) Why would the "grumble itself going on forever like a machine" not be "mercy-killed"?  Why would it go on forever?  (f) Is it the nature of a (mere) animal to live forever (Aquinas thought not) or does it take a special miracle for it to live forever?

Here I will briefly pursue only the first question and will not come down on a definitive answer.

Adopting 2 has the following consequence: If a human is a rational-animal, then Nancy would not be essentially human, for Nancy could become an animal with no capacity for reason or free choice.  We will thus have to adopt one of the following neither of which is intuitively plausible:
3. One can have a human nature while not having any capacity for rationality 
4. Kinds of things such as I am are not essentially human 

Adopting 1, though, also has a theoretical cost, for we will have to adopt one of the following:
5. Nancy was never a living organism (and thus not an animal) in the first place, for Nancy ceases to be but the organism remains (she was a person with psychological properties not identical with all of the properties of the organism) .
6. Nancy was an organism but one which was once co-located with the animal organism that continues to exist after she ceases to be. 

Out of those possibilities 3 and 5 seem to me more plausible than 4 and 6.  But perhaps the best option would be to reject the view of annihilationism that Lewis was entertaining.  Or perhaps there are other options I haven't pondered.

An Argument for Annihilationism

In the previous post I offered an argument against annihilationism.

In an email conversation, a friend called into question my premise two, and in its place offered the following argument (all the premises of which he did not fully endorse):

1.  The finally unrepentant are hopelessly lost, because they have irrevocably rejected God.
2.  God is the ultimate source of flourishing.  

2*  If y loves x, then (among other things) either y promotes x's flourishing or acts to prevent x's languishing.

3.  The finally unrepentant thus have no chance of flourishing in a robust sense.  (That is, apart from merely existing and (perhaps) possessing free will, they are profoundly languishing.)
4.  From 2*, if God loves the unrepentant and knows that they cannot possibly flourish in a robust sense, then God will act to prevent their languishing.
5.  There are two ways to prevent this languishing: (1) Remove their free will and force them to love him, or (2) annihilate them.
6.  Losing one's free will is a fate worse than annihilation.
7.  So, God annihilates the finally unrepentant.

This argument in some ways brings to mind ideas that C.S. Lewis entertains in The Great Divorce.  But more on that in a future post on the subject.

I find premise 5 initially problematic.  Perhaps one could be forced to love someone with a defective kind of love, but not with the perfect kind of love which Christianity teaches is a constituent of the human end.  (Moreover, if one could remove the free will to prevent languishing, presumably one could prevent the person from ever reaching such a hopeless state in the first place calling into question premise 1.)

Sub-conclusion 3 is also suspect, at least as "robust flourishing" is parenthetically cashed out.  Perhaps hell consists in some flourishing beyond the mere possessing of free will (perhaps it consists in exercising free will for some finite goods, knowledge of God, playing a role in God's just plan for the world, having some desires satisfied even if other desires are not, etc.).  I expect to say about this in a future post.

Premise 6 might be incoherent.  It seems to presume that annihilation is an action I can undergo being done to me--an action that can be "enjoyed" by me (relative to suffering).  But my annihilation is not something that happens to me just as the ex nihilo creation of the universe is not something that happens to the universe.  The universe does not change or have anything good or bad done to it when it is created ex nihilo. It simply comes into being.  Similarly with annihilation.  I do not change when annihilated--perhaps the universe changes from having me in it to not having me in it, but I neither acquire nor lose any properties if annihilated.  I simply cease to exist.  So annihilation can be neither good nor bad for me.  But since it cannot be a good for me it cannot be an action of love toward me.  

For that reason in rejecting 6 I also reject 2*.  One can only love someone by preventing his languishing if the languishing for that person is replaced by something positively good for that person.  

But suppose I'm the communist, Stalin.  Might the act of annihilating me be an act of love towards someone else such that God might do it?

Having few Calvinist bones in my body (i.e. zero), I believe God treats none of his creatures as mere means (nor would he).  But God would not be using me as a mere means if he annihilated me, so that line of response won't work.

We can admit that surely someone else's ceasing to experience the pain I'm causing them and instead experiencing tranquility would be good for them.  I think the proper thing to say is that God could just as well isolate me from the ones I'm harming while still willing what is good for me as well.  And it is surely plausible that it would not only be good for them but also good for me to be isolated from them (for it would be good for me do something other than hurting them).  Suffice it to say for now that I think God's nature is such that he wills only what is good for each of his creatures, so annihilating any of them is not a viable option for God.  Whatever hell amounts to, though unpleasant, it must be a product of not only divine justice but divine love for its inhabitant.  But it would be good to have an argument for these latter claims.

An Argument Against Annihilationism

I recently tried this argument out against the view that the ultimately unrepentant are annihilated.  I take for granted in the first premise that God in a deep sense is love and as such all of his actions must be understood as loving ones.

1. Any action of God's towards some x (who can be an object of love) must be consistent with God's loving x.

2. If y loves x (among other things) y promotes some good G for x (e.g. desires G for x/intends G for x/brings about G for x, etc).

3. One cannot promote any goods for x if x does not exist.

4. If x is annihilated then x does not exist.

5. If x does not exist, then there are no goods for x for y to promote for x.

6. Thus, annihilating x is inconsistent with loving x.
7. Thus, God would not annihilate x.

I think probably the initial reaction will be to reject 5: An action of removing your pain, suffering, or languishing is consistent with loving you and annihilating you would do the trick. Annihilation, in such a case, would be a good for me.

Reply: It is only good for me to have my pain removed if I PERSIST through the pain being removed from me.  There is no good FOR ME being promoted at time T if my pain and I both go out of existence simultaneously at T. My annihilation is not a good for me, for I cease to exist simultaneously with my being annihilated.  Just as it makes no sense to think that there are any goods for me to be promoted before I exist, so too it makes no sense to think that there are goods for me when I cease to exist.  And the annihilation of me is my ceasing to exist.  (I assume that my existence is not vague and there is no process I undergo of being annihilated.  Annihilation is an action taken such that I no longer exist, it's not a process I could "enjoy"  undergoing.)

I'm not fully satisfied with this response.  If I go out of existence, it could be argued that my legacy is something which is a good for me, and one could promote my legacy even if I went out of existence.  ("That Tully sure was a great guy!")  Further, one could honor me with a proper burial of my body, if, say, I went out of existence at death.  Still, perhaps we should think that in such cases these actions are in no way goods in my life, and one who believed I truly went out of existence should not think that these actions are really goods for me.  These actions are not actions of loving me (I don't exist), but they are actions done out of love for the memory of me.  People could no longer love me---since there is no me to love--but they could love their memory of me.  Or perhaps such actions are done out of love for my family or loved ones.  Or perhaps they are done out of love for me in one's mind, but they are not loving actions of the extra-mental me (who has ceased to exist).

God and Light

There are a lot of similarities between God and light, so it's no wonder that the association is a strong one from antiquity on.  Both are responsible for us knowing things, both seem to be everywhere (or nearly so), both are mysterious, and so forth.  Here is perhaps another similarity:

It's a common misconception that we perceive light--but we don't, at least we don't perceive light in any straightforward or ordinary way.  I can perceive a chair or my dog with my sensory faculties (I can touch my dog or see my dog or heaven forbid taste my dog) but none of the above holds for light.  Some say we can see light, but that too seems false.  Light, we're told, is a particle-wave duality; light consists of photons.  None of this we perceive.  Like God, light is invisible.

So how do we know that there is light?  One answer would be that we infer the existence of light from things that we do see.  We notice that some things are more visible than others when they are nearer to fire.  We notice that when the moon itself is more visible, other things are as well.  Considerations like these perhaps lead us to reason to the conclusion that there is this thing, light, that exists.

But I have my doubts that this is the way things ordinarily go.  I don't ever recall reasoning in this sort of way to the conclusion that there is light.  If there was an inference to the conclusion, it was a subconscious one.  It seems to me that I either (a) came to believe that there was light by way of testimony--by my mom or dad telling me that there is this thing, light, or (b) my belief was innate or (c) it was produced by no ordinary evidential process or faculty but arose from some subconscious process.

And it seems to me that the same is true with people and God.  Most do not arrive at belief in God by way of argument or reasoning.  For most, the belief is formed in the basic sort of way.  There is some evidence from cognitive science that this is the case.  According to some studies, most small children (even with atheist parents) seem to believe in God or something like God.  We seem to come predisposed for theistic belief.  So too, infants seems to believe in things like gravity, that physical objects are impenetrable, and so forth.  Perhaps infants come into the world with the belief that there is both God and light.

Biblical Paradox?

[UPDATE: This post suffers from some cyber leprosy that I cannot seem to get rid of without a Ph.D. in HTML.  Still, we are called to love the lepers even if hating the leprosy.]

Philippians 2:3 is an interesting verse, but the last part of it is difficult (for me) to understand, and, at least as it is often translated, could easily be interpreted as paradoxical.

NIV: Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit, rather in humility value others above yourselves
ESV: ... count others more significant than yourselves
NASB: ...regard one another as more important than yourselves
KJB: ...let each esteem other better than themselves

Let us for the moment understand "regarding one as" as "believing one is". And let us suppose additionally that Paul is saying that humility consists in considering or believing another is more valuable, important, esteemed, and significant than oneself, and let us suppose that a Christian community should believe Philippians 2:3 and understand it in this way.  Then here is a paradox: