A Defense that the Universe Begins to Exist

A friend recently raised the following interesting, objection to William Lane Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument for God's existence.  Craig's basic argument is as follows:

1. Anything which begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Thus the universe has a cause.

Craig then proceeds to defend (1)--the causal principle, (2) that the universe does not have an infinite past and thus begins to exist, and finally that the best explanation for the cause of the universe is God.

My friend's objection was to premise two, even conceding that the universe does not have an infinite past.  His objection: just as there is no good reason for thinking that a universe with an infinite past which exists at all times past begins to exist, so too there is no good reason for thinking that a universe which does not have an infinite past and exists at all times past begins to exist.  In short, why should we think that anything which exists at all times past can rightly be said to begin to exist?

A good question, one which I'm unaware that Craig addresses.

Here is an argument in defense of Craig's claim that the universe begins to exist (on the assumption that the universe does not have an infinite past):

1. One is immortal only if one exists at some time and does not permanently cease to exist.
2. If time eventually comes to an end, then someone--Ted--existing for only 30 years right up until the end of time either (a) permanently ceased to exist or (b) does not permanently cease to exist.
3. If Ted does not permanently cease to exist at the end of time, then Ted lives only 30 years in the entire history of time and is immortal.
4. But it is absurd that someone could live for only 30 years in the entire history of time and be immortal.
5. Thus if time eventually comes to an end, then Ted permanently ceases to exist.
6. If 5, then it is sufficient for permanently ceasing to exist that x exists until there is no subsequent time.
7.  So it is sufficient for permanently ceasing to exist that x exists until there is no subsequent time.
8. If it is sufficient for permanently ceasing to exist that x exists until there is no subsequent time, then it is sufficient for beginning to exist that x exists when there is no prior time.
9. Thus it is sufficient for beginning to exist that x exists when there is no prior time.