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| Makes sense to me |
A common objection is what we might call the "anything goes" objection. The idea is that if theological voluntarism were true, then God could make it the case that raping babies is morally permissible and good by commanding it, that punching your grandma in the face is a daily obligation, that microwaving cats (or better--dogs) is an act of justice, and so forth. But of course such acts are wrong--and necessarily so, some think--thus there must be something wrong with theological voluntarism.
To see why this is a bad strategy for objecting to theological voluntarism consider the following propositions:
1. If theological voluntarism were true, then raping a baby might be permissible.
2. If Kant's Categorical Imperative were true, then raping a baby might be permissible.
3. If J.S. Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle were true, then raping a baby might be permissible.
4. If moral relativism were true, then raping a baby might be permissible.
Now consider the following argument against TV and a parity argument against Kant's CI:
1. If TV were true, then raping babies might be permissible.
2. But raping babies can't be permissible.
3. Thus TV is false.
Now consider this parallel:
4. If Kant's CI were true, then raping babies might be permissible.
5. But raping babies can't be permissible.
6. Thus Kant's CI is false.
The questions that need asking are which principle or normative theory is true in the first place and which are contradictory with raping babies being permissible? (Is 1 true or is 4?) What the objector to theological voluntarism needs to show is that God could or would will that babies be raped, just as the objector to Kant's CI needs to show that raping babies is inconsistent with the CI. For it does not obviously follow that if morality is grounded in God's will that there's a possible world (or close possible world) where God wills the raping of babies.
I don't suppose I'm following you here...this objection to TV is standardly cashed out in terms of a reductio. "Any normative theory according to which raping babies may come out as permissible is a ridiculous normative theory. TV implies that raping babies may turn out to be permissible. Thus, TV is a ridiculous theory." None of the other theories are open to this type of reductio. So...I guess I don't see why a reductio in the case of TV is such a bad strategy.
ReplyDeleteThough mayhap I'm just missing the point.
I have in mind a quick and dirty reductio like the following:
ReplyDelete1. If TV were true, then raping babies might be permissible.
2. But raping babies can't be permissible.
3. Thus TV is false.
Now consider this parallel:
1. If Kant's CI were true, then raping babies might be permissible.
2. But raping babies can't be permissible.
3. Thus Kant's CI is false.
To make the objection stick, you'd need to argue that there are close possible worlds wherein God commands that babies be raped just like you'd need to argue from the CI that it excludes raping babies. (And if you changed "might" to "could" you'd have to argue that there are possible worlds where God commands/intends/etc. rape).
Can God's will be arbitrary? This works if we have a pagan deity, a being distinct from other beings. But if we believe that God is One, then there can be no law given apart from himself.
ReplyDeleteThanks for the comment, Marcus.
ReplyDeleteI don't think it could be wholly arbitrary, since I think that some principle of sufficient reason is true (though, some have disagreed, e.g., Descartes.) The PSR which I hold to be true is that every contingent truth has an explanation. If that is true, then for any contingent act of will by God, it has an explanation (perhaps in terms of some law about human nature & requirements for flourishing or truth about God's character, goodness, etc.) That would still leave room for some arbitrariness, but nothing unseemly. Suppose God (just for the sake of illustration) has a reason for commanding the Hebrews not to eat a certain kind of food, either forbidding the eating of shellfish or cows will do for God's purposes; let's say that the reason was to make the people stand out more as God's chosen people during a particularly time in history. SO God randomly chooses to forbid the eating of shellfish instead of cows. That he chose shellfish instead of cows is arbitrary, but that he chose shellfish or cows and not fish is not. So his picking shellfish has *a* reason but not a sufficient/determining one since God could have equally well chosen cows.
A worry with God's will not being in any way arbitrary is that it would seem that determinism or fatalism would be true. If there were a sufficient and complete explanation for every act of God's will, that would include his act to create this world; but Christian doctrine has been pretty consistent going back at least to the 1277 condemnations in Paris in denouncing that God was necessitated in creating this particular world.
Have you ever come across Origen's De Principis? I think his argument for the necessity of God creating the world was pretty decent.
DeleteOf course, the folks who were writing the Scriptures were asking very different questions about God, and very different ways of answering them. Thanks for your comment!
I have not. If you can point me to a sketch of it online somewhere, I'd be interested to check it out.
DeleteThough it's typically been thought to be a heresy that God had to create this world, I'm unsure whether there has ever been a council condemning the proposition that it's God's nature to create some world or other.