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Putting all of this together, it is difficult to figure out what Walton means by God's establishing functions and installing functionaries in a sense that has nothing to do with material origins! Perhaps the most charitable thing to do would be to throw up one's hands and conclude that the book is radically unclear. What could it mean for all the plants already to be growing, providing food for animals, the sun to be shining, etc., but for these entities nonetheless to lack functions prior to a set of specific 24-hour days in a specific week? Throwing up his hands in despair at interpreting Walton is what one scholarly critic, Vern Poythress, essentially does after an exchange with Walton.Like McGrew, it was not clear to me that there is a coherent sense in which things are (or could be) "receiving functions" from God during the (literal) seven days. That is, given that--on Walton's account--the material things (creatures and the like) already seem to be kinds of things prior to the seven day period (and thus have structures, capacities, abilities, etc.), it's not clear what giving functions could amount to during the seven day period. One might hold, sensibly I think, that to be is to be a kind of thing; to be a kind of thing is to have a nature; and to have a nature is to have (a) characteristic function(s).
Walton makes an appearance in the comments section followed by an awkward exchange. (MarcAnthony's over-the-top remark is a good example of what is problematic with open comment boxes). Though I've had a couple run-ins with McGrew, I didn't take her review to be outside the bounds of the ethical norms of book reviewing. I look forward to reading and listening to the other reviews to which she has linked.
Not sure if your mention of the "awkward exchange" concerned MarcAnthony or not. Now, perhaps MA's remark was "over the top," as you suggest...But for my part, I do think Walton's comment was ridiculous at best, and deserved a sharp rebuke (which he subsequently received from folks other than MA who were, it seems to me, a bit more civil than MA if not gesturing toward the same point).
ReplyDeleteI concur, as my penultimate sentence suggests. At the very least, if I think someone has gotten my view terribly wrong, I'm not going to be saying anything unless I point out at least ONE way that I've been misread. Otherwise, well, it looks like I really don't have anything to say in my defense....
ReplyDeleteYou'll find Evangelicals OT and ANE scholars interacting and disagreeing with Walton on this same point. (I'm thinking specifically of Richard Averbeck.)
ReplyDeleteI don't mean this as a defense of what Walton's doing, but the distinction between function and functionaries is really helpful mostly because we have difficulty thinking in terms other than material origins. Walton's main point is that Genesis 1 isn't answering the questions that we're asking, something evangelical scholars on this topic are basically agreed upon. We ask the "scientific" and material questions, but Genesis is offering something different.
I think that a better way forward is to consider Gen 1 doing both: material and functional creation, and Walton helps us crawl into the "functional" categories of the ancient text.
(And, here is a brief defense of Walton: he doesn't think that YHWH did NOT create the material world, but that Genesis 1 doesn't tell us how he did it. It answers a different question. It shows us that our God is a good one [the only one, in fact] and he arranged the world to be very good.)
Thanks for the comment, Michael.
ReplyDelete"Walton's main point is that Genesis 1 isn't answering the questions that we're asking, something evangelical scholars on this topic are basically agreed upon."
Let's hope not, since the science is overwhelming against the sun being created on the fourth day! :)
"I think that a better way forward is to consider Gen 1 doing both: material and functional creation, and Walton helps us crawl into the "functional" categories of the ancient text."
How would the material creation of the sun on the FOURTH day square with physics? I'm open to Genesis 1 being some sort of metaphysical/theological "true myth" in the C.S. Lewis sense. (I don't have a good argument from ancient history to support this, I'm just registering my openness to such a possibility). Genesis 1 is (perhaps) offers a concrete, memorable description which is intended to pass on the important truths that (e.g.) there is one God who created everything, that in the beginning all that was created was good, that there are no gods waging war over the creation, that humans are the apex of God's creative activity, etc. Sure, some people will also come to believe some false things, but the false things are intrinsically unimportant and aren't intended to be believed by God.
"And, here is a brief defense of Walton: he doesn't think that YHWH did NOT create the material world, but that Genesis 1 doesn't tell us how he did it."
Right, I didn't take him to be denying that God did not create the material world. My problems are McGrew's. Aside from a lack of good arguments establishing his interpretation, in particular, it seems incoherent that God can (e.g.) assign a function to some already existing thing which has no function. For instance he says,
"This is a functional ontology rather than a material ontology. In this view, when something does not exist, it is lacking role, not lacking matter. Consequently, to create something (cause it to exist) means to give it a function, not material properties."
I would say that it makes no sense to think that a material object can exist without having a function. An electron with mass but no spin is not an electron. Moreover, what he says seems to be incoherent on another score. On the one hand, the last sentence suggests that to create something is to give an already material thing a function. Otherwise, it doesn't exist. But in giving an already existing material object a function, the material thing has to already exist!
A few other problems: "Thus on day 1 God created a period of light to alternate with a period of darkness, i.e., God created time—a function."
Whatever time is, it does not seem to be a function. What would be a function OF? According to Aristotle, the function of a human is to act in accordance with reason. That is the function proper to humans which makes humans different from animals. One might dispute this claim with Aristotle, but it's intelligible. Humans are not themselves functions. Nor does light seem to be a function (though perhaps photons have a function).