A Defense Against an Eliminativist Argument

Here's a quick (eliminativist) argument that there are no chairs (I've seen similar arguments):

1. Atoms arranged chair-wise can do all the same causal work that chairs would do if there were chairs over and above atoms arranged chair-wise (swivel, keep your butt from hitting the floor, etc.)
2. Ockham's Razor.
3. Thus no chairs, buildings, arms, scissors....

Most people believe that chairs exist. It's just a Moorean fact for the vast majority of people. They think they *know* that there are chairs. "Of course there are chairs!" So what should most people think about the above argument, particularly premise 1?

I think they should reject it if they also hold the following causal-epistemic principle:
C: If S knows about some x, x plays a causal role in the knowledge of x.

C is plausible--especially if we allow for more than efficient causation. If I walked into a room and saw a hologram of a telephone, forming the belief that there is a phone in the room, I don't have knowledge that there is a phone in the room even if there is one (e.g. on the other side of the room where I haven't observed). I have made no epistemic or psychological contact with the phone.

So if you think that you know there is a chair and accept C, you should think there *is* something for the chair to do in addition to the atoms arranged chair-wise, namely, play a causal role in your knowing that there are chairs. Of course this isn't an argument for the existence of chairs against the eliminativist but it neutralizes the above argument.

Trenton Merricks' reply to a similar defense against the eliminitivist is to say that once one realizes that atoms arranged chair-wise can do all that a chair could do, one's justification for believing in chairs is undermined.  To that I say that one has no justification for the existence of chairs in the first place, at least not in terms of any argument. It just seems that there are chairs. Moreover it just seems that one knows that there are chairs. How is one's justification or warrant undermined? Why is one still not entitled to this belief?

The Universe Doesn't Exist

If the universe did exist, it would be composed of you and I, trees, birds, rocks, planets, and whatever things exist in space more generally.  If it were composed of you and I, we would be parts of the universe.  But I am a substance--either a living organism that has parts or an immaterial soul.  Either way, since I am a substance, I am not a proper part of anything else.  This just follows from what it is to be a substance.   If we follow Aristotle in thinking that living things are substances, none is a part of the universe.  As well, if fundamental particles are substances, they are not a part of the universe either.  But then from the first statement above, the universe does not exist, since if it did, the things mentioned would be a part of it.

One could hold, alternatively, that there is only a single material substance, the universe, everything else being a part of it. 

Am I Essentially Material, an Animal, a Human?

Here is an inconsistent set of propositions:

1. I am essentially human.
2. Humans are animals essentially.
3. Animals are essentially material.
4. I can exist immaterially with no material parts.

One could deny 1.  Perhaps to be a human just is to be a (rational) animal.  I can survive death and exist immaterially, but since animals are essentially material I would not be an animal and thus not a human.

One could deny 2.  Perhaps I am essentially a human, but one can exist with no material parts and still be a human, since animality is merely a stage in a human life.  Or perhaps I'm never an animal.

One could deny 3.  Perhaps I am essentially a human and humans are essentially animals.  However since I can survive the death of my body, an animal (me) can exist with no material parts.

One could deny 4: Perhaps I am essentially material and cannot exist with no material parts.

My inclination is to deny 2 or 3, leaning towards a denial of 3.  It could be that all humans must begin to exist having a material part but can exist immaterially.  But it could be true that humans are essentially immaterial, in which case one should reject 2.

Was Jesus in the Tomb?

In a recent discussion I objected to the following premise by J.S. in a theological argument on theological grounds:

Premise: Humans are essentially embodied.

There are at least two theological counterexamples.  One is that humans survive death until the resurrection.  The other is that Jesus descended into hell while his body was still in the tomb.  If either are true then humans are not essentially embodied (provided that one is a human essentially).

To that, M.C. responded that there is no good Biblical evidence that Jesus went to hell, citing 1 Peter 3:19, Revelation 20:3, and that in the Creed it refers to Hades where dead bodies go.

Here, I do not wish to argue for any definitive theological proposition, rather I will point out potential options available to make sense of the empty tomb.  This is a rough sketch.  I will avoid arguments in favor of and problems with each view, though for a couple I point out some difficulties.

My Daughter Vs. Lawrence M. Krauss

My daughter (Malea) and I were listening to Michael Feldman's What'dya Know? show on NPR yesterday, and Feldman had on physicist Lawrence Krauss to discuss his book, A Universe from Nothing (the show might have been a repeat). I mentioned Krauss's book and his atheism recently.

So we're listening to his views on the universe, and I hadn't commented on anything except  briefly to say a few things about the curvature of space-time in response to Malea's question concerning whether it was true that the universe is curved.  Krauss is going on and on about "nothing" and apparently Malea had finally had enough:

Krauss [I'm paraphrasing]: "One of the great mysteries is that if we remove all the matter, radiation, energy, and so forth from a region of space so that there's nothing there, the nothing still weighs something."

Malea: "That's because there's SOMETHING there!!"

I Do Not Exist

Inspired by an argument by Peter Unger:

Suppose that I exist. Then,
1. If I exist, then I am an animal.
2. If I am an animal, I am composed of a finite number of cells.
3. So if I exist, then I am composed of a finite number of cells.
4. For any cell of mine one might remove (which is not replaced by another cell), I will not cease to be me (that is, my identity is not so tenuous as to rely on being composed by any particular cell).
5. But then if 4 is true, then if you remove each cell, then I would not cease to be me.
6. If 5, then I would not cease to be. 
7. Thus, if all of my cells were removed, I would not cease to be.
8. HOWEVER, if one removed every cell composing me, then the animal which I am (according to 1) will cease to be (at some point in the cell removal process the animal will die).
9. But then we have a contradiction: If one were to remove all of my cells I would not cease to be (from 7) and I would cease to be (from 8, 1).
10. Thus what was supposed is false.
11. Thus, I do not exist.

Could God Make a Cadillac So Shiny That He Could See His Own Invisible Attributes In It?

The answer may not seem obvious.  It is about as obvious as whether God is powerful enough such that He could turn himself into a billiard ball.
I asked the latter question in class yesterday.  I'll take a stab at answering it and leave it to the reader to answer the former question.

Galileo's Conditions for Conceiving a Material Body

In Modern Philosophy yesterday we read a selection from Galileo's The Assayer in which we find the following statement on the necessary conditions for conceiving a material body:

Now, whenever I conceive of any material or corporeal substance, I am necessarily constrained to conceive of that substance as [a] bounded and [b] as possessing this or that shape, [c] as large or small in relationship to some other body, [d] as in this or that place during this or that time, [e] as in motion or at rest, [f] as in contact or not in contact with some other body, [g] as being one, many, or few--and by no stretch of imagination can I conceive of any corporeal body apart from these conditions.

What struck me at first as dubious is condition [c]--Galileo can only conceive of some material body in relation to some other material body. This means that Galileo couldn't conceive of the existence of, say, a single bar of gold.  For any body he can conceive it must be conceived in relation to some other body.  So he can only conceive of two bodies or more.

But perhaps the idea is that in order to conceive of a single bar of gold one must conceive of a left half and a right half of which the bar is composed--each of which the bar is larger than.

But what about a point particle, such as an electron which has no extension? Conceiving it would violate [c] as well as [a] and [b].  But electrons can be conceived.

Perhaps Galileo is confusing imagining or picturing with conceiving.  One can't picture an electron though one can conceive of an electron.

Alternatively--though I am sure this was not Galileo's view--a metaphysician of an empiricist bent could hold that the above criteria do more or less accurately provide the criteria for conceiving of a material body while being an instrumentalist rather than a realist about "material substances" such as electrons.