![Tullius est [et Tullius non est Cicero]](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwDG4xhsMn9o9J6nFVbJuaWEgUYVbxr7B9gbOXGZ3gwOu55lJg3q0Ev-z3MhLy29603_fkvvngkYmsTvRd4BATcVzZvVOhgkPSy-GIAuaFE0sCVBc_zcTW_d2mKKeCWhMxsZhAPyqXzymO/s1600/cicero-right-1024x603.jpg)
Like God's natural knowledge--his knowledge of what is possible, necessary, and impossible--God's middle knowledge is logically prior to his decision to create (or actualize) this world. But like God's free knowledge, middle knowledge is of contingently true propositions.
Here is an example of how God knows the future on the basis of middle knowledge:
1. God knows that if Eve were placed in the garden, she would freely eat the fruit.
2. God knows that he creates a world in which Eve is placed in the garden.
3. God deduces that Eve will eat the fruit.*
Now suppose we understand free will to be incompatible with determinism and define a free action as follows:
An action A is free in circumstance C if and only if it is elicited by an agent G in C and G is not causally determined to elicit A.Then Molinism is compatible with human free actions. For God creates circumstances in which agents such as Eve elicit an action (e.g. an intention or other act of will), but God and other agents (or events) do not causally determine that the action is elicited--rather Eve exercises her will of her own accord.
But suppose we add that the future is open to Eve such that there are two possible futures open to Eve at some time T. In one possible future at T, Eve freely eats the fruit; in another possible future Eve freely refrains from eating the fruit. That is, we think that a free action is defined as follows:
An action A at time T in circumstance C is free if and only if it is elicited by an agent G, G is not causally determined to elicit A, and at T in C, G has the ability to refrain from willing A or to will some other action B.
Then Molinism is incompatible with human free will. For on the Molinist understanding God is able to know what G would freely do in C and there is only one free action G would do if C were actual. That is, there is no other possible circumstance C wherein G freely refrains from A or elicits some other action B. There are not two possible futures open to G where, in the exact same circumstances G freely wills A in C but freely refrains or wills B in C. If A were to refrain or will B in C, A would be causally determined to do so.
So is Molinism incompatible with free will? If free will requires that one have a power such that alternative possibilities are open to one in virtue of having that power then the answer is, no.
* If God is atemporal it is difficult to see how God could have foreknowledge, properly speaking, according to Molinism. God would have B-theory knowledge--for instance he would know that Rome's burning precedes Obama getting elected president in the ordered sequence of events--but God would not have knowledge at Rome's burning that Obama will be elected president.
If God is temporal then he would have genuine foreknowledge. He would have it on the basis of his middle knowledge and quasi-perceptual knowledge that such and such time is now and such and such later time is in the future with respect to the present.
I think first one needs to establish that Middle Knowledge is self-consistent concept.
ReplyDeleteYou define it as
"If x were in circumstance C, then x would freely do A."
It may be that this is inconsistent with the definition of the "free act".
I think this is perhaps part of the reason why Molinists should be Frankfurt-style libertarians, or as Kevin Timpe calls them, source incompatibilists (his book Free Will is worth the read).
ReplyDeleteVishal,
ReplyDeleteI think Molinism is inconsistent with the various principles in the family of
"Principle of Alternative Possibilities." But a Molinist will deny the principle.
Matt,
ReplyDeleteI've read some articles by Timpe but not his book. I've meant to for a while. I just finished Robert Kane's Contemporary Introduction to Free Will of a new course I'm teaching; so I've had about all the free will I can stomach for a while.
Tully,
ReplyDeleteI suggested on the Facebook that the Molinist will resist you when you say, "For on the Molinist understanding God is able to know what G would freely do in C and there is only one free action G would do if C were actual. That is, there is no other possible circumstance C wherein G freely refrains from A or elicits some other action B."
I think the Molinist would say that an agent is not genuinely free unless there is another world wherein the agent does not-A in the exact same circumstances. God is able to use his middle knowledge because he knows all the possible worlds, and he knows that, relative to the world he actualizes, If agent x were in circumstance C, he would freely do A.
You posted some Craig related Craig passages that indicate that we were both partially write. Craig says, "On the Molinist view, there are 2 logical moments prior to the divine decree: first, the moment at which he has knowledge of the range of possible worlds [i.e. necessary truths], and second, the moment at which he has knowledge of the proper subset of possible worlds that, given the counterfactuals [better: subjunctive conditions, since prior to God's decision to create there are no counter to fact antecedents at this logical moment] true at that moment [i.e. contingently true], are feasible to create. The counterfactuals which are true at that moment thus serve to delimit the range of possible worlds to worlds feasible for God.
For example, there is a possible world in which Peter affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances in which he in fact denied him. But given the counterfactual truth that if Peter were in precisely those circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in those circumstances is not feasible for God. God could MAKE Peter affirm Christ in those circumstances, but then his confession would not be free."
You add some analysis that I agree with: "So there are intrinsically possible worlds in which Peter freely affirms Christ but, given middle knowledge, they are not feasible worlds.
This is (contingently) true:"If Peter were in C, he would freely deny Christ."
This is also true: There is a possible world where Peter is in C and freely affirm Christ.
This is false: "If Peter were in C, he would freely affirm Christ."
So a Molinist like Craig is going to have to say that the contingent subjunctive conditionals can't be given a possible world analysis in terms of the actual world and close possible worlds because they are contingently true logically prior to God's decision to create. They are just brute."
I think Craig says something weird in the passage of his above. Consider what he calls the second logical moment. He says, "The counterfactuals which are true at that moment thus serve to delimit the range of possible worlds to worlds feasible for God." How could they possibly do this? All the subjective conditionals at this moment would be vacuously true, as they would all have false antecedents.
I thought I was going to have something else to say, but I'm stuck. I'll leave it there.
"I think Craig says something weird in the passage of his above. Consider what he calls the second logical moment. He says, "The counterfactuals which are true at that moment thus serve to delimit the range of possible worlds to worlds feasible for God." How could they possibly do this? All the subjective conditionals at this moment would be vacuously true, as they would all have false antecedents."
ReplyDeleteI raise a similar concern in my IEP article I wrote 9 years ago:
This kind of objection can be put in a slightly different way. How is it that God knows which of the true subjunctives of freedom are factuals rather than counterfactuals of freedom? Recall that a factual of freedom has a true antecedent and a counterfactual of freedom a false antecedent. But the truth or falsity of the antecedent cannot be known prior to God’s creative activity. For instance, God only knows that it is true that “Eve is in the garden in the circumstances in which a serpent tempts her to eat fruit” after he creates her in these circumstances and knows that it is false that “A Martian is in the garden in the circumstances in which a serpent tempts her to eat fruit” after he decides not to create Martians. But then God cannot know which subjunctive of freedom (that has either the information about Eve or the Martian in the antecedent) should be used in an argument to deduce what will happen in the future prior to his creating.