Below is my reconstruction of Lynne Rudder Baker and Gareth Matthews' very interesting 2010 The Review of Metaphysics article, "Anselm's Argument Reconsidered," explicating and defending Anselm's argument:
Reconstruction of Anselm’s Argument in the Proslogion
2
First, here is a sub-argument
to support Anselm’s Argument:
a. The theist and the atheist
refer to the same object with the words “that than which nothing greater can be
conceived.” ["that than which nothing greater can be conceived" being the definition of "God"]
Therefore,
b. That than which nothing
greater can be conceived is an object that exists in both the theist’s and
atheist’s understanding [by (a) and the meaning of “existing in the
understanding”].
Let S be the object that
exists in the theist’s and atheist’s understanding and that is such that
nothing greater can be conceived. So,
c. S is the object that
exists in the theist’s and atheist’s understanding and that is such that
nothing greater can be conceived [(b) and stipulation of “S”].
Therefore,
d. S exists in thought [[c]
and stipulation “exists in the understanding”= “exists in thought”]
The Main Argument
1. S exists in thought and S
does not exist in reality [supposition for reductio
ad absurdum].
2. An otherwise exact same
thing as S that existed both in thought and in reality is conceivable.
3. Greatness Principle (G):
For anything x that existed only in thought, an otherwise same thing that
existed both in thought and in reality would be greater (not just greater in
thought) than x.
4. If S exists in thought and
not in reality and an otherwise exact same thing as S that existed both in
thought and in reality is conceivable, then an otherwise exact same thing as S
that existed both in thought and in reality would be greater than S [by 1 and
(G)].
5. An otherwise exact same
thing as S that existed both in thought and in reality would be greater than S
[1, 2, conjunction, 4, modus ponens].
6. If an otherwise exact same
thing as S that existed both in thought and in reality and is conceivable would
be greater than S, then there can be a conceivable object that is greater than
S [namely, an otherwise exact same thing as S that also existed in reality].
Therefore,
7. There can be a conceivable
object that is greater than S [5, 6 modus ponens].
8. There can be no
conceivable object that is greater than S [line (c) above].
9. There can be a conceivable
object that is greater than S, and there can be no conceivable object that is
greater than S [7, 8 conjunction].
Contradiction!
Therefore,
10. It is not the case that:
S exists in thought and S does not exist in reality [1-9, reductio ad absurdum]
Therefore,
11. S does exist in reality
[10, DeMorgan’s rule (~(p&q)= ~p v ~q); line (d); disjunctive syllogism
(pvq &~p then q].
Nice reconstruction. I'm up preparing to skype with a friend's class tomorrow. He wanted me to talk about reasons to believe in God, and I remembered you had posted on the ontological argument. I'm going to use this some to walk the students through Anselm, which I asked them to read.
ReplyDeleteSo what do Lynne Rudder Baker say about Gaunilon's objection?
ReplyDeleteI can't remember. Of course the thing to say (what Anselm should have said) is that one can't conceive of a perfect island. It makes no sense. You can always add one more coconut and dancing girl.
Yeah, but that plays into the hand of the opponent of the ontological argument. You need to have an answer ready for why we can conceive of a perfect being, although we can't conceive of a perfect island, or perfect whatever other example someone might use.
ReplyDeleteIt's pretty easy to notice that conceiving of an absolutely perfect island is impossible; after all, it's bounded and finite. It's not as easy to see why one can't conceive of an absolutely perfect being in general. But if someone says that they can't conceive of such a being, I don't know of any good argument the conclusion of which is "you can conceive of such a being."
ReplyDelete